Ad-Aware PR
By: roy_batty
[Abstract]
Ad-Aware is a poorly written anti-spyware program from Lavasoft. Running
it gives you a false sense of safeness. There can be done numerous attacks
against this software. I'll show some of the problems and attacks in this
write-up. Here's just a summary of the most visible problems I've run into.
1. Definition file
1.1. "Encrypted" with xor \
1.2. Packed with ZIP with simple password - trivial to intercept def
updates and change the defs
to make the malware invisible
1.3. No checksum in the def file /
1.4. Big redundancy in the def file
1.5. !!! Multiplying the number of entries in the def file with constant
1.46 to make it look it has more definitions !!!
2. Program
2.1. Poorly written checksum algo
2.2. Poorly written scanning algo (slow as hell)
2.3. CSI works only for in-memory images and is useless
You want the proofs? Read the following text ...
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1. [Intro]
"Lavasoft is the industry leader and most respected provider of
anti-spyware solutions. Lavasoft develops and delivers the highest quality
antispyware solutions to keep your computer or network free of
compromising and intrusive threats to your privacy."
--
This write-up reviews the industry leading antispyware solution from the most
respected provider of anti-spyware solutions - Ad-Aware from Lavasoft. I
will show that this software is just a piece of crap, nothing more,
nothing less. PR sells, right?
2. [Ad-Aware SE]
"Ad-Aware SE is the latest version of our award winning and industry
leading line of antispyware solutions and represents the next generation
in Spyware detection and removal. It is quite simply the most advanced
solution available to protect your privacy. With the all new Code Sequence
Identification (CSI) technology that we have developed, you will not only
be protected from known content, but will also have advanced protection
against many of their unknown variants. "
--
2.1. "Encrypted" with xor
The reference file defs.ref is just a plain ZIP file that is then
"encrypted" using following algo.
void decode_mem(char *b, unsigned int b_s)
{
static char decode_string[] = "\x00\x50\x50\x50\x50\x50\x50\x50\x68\x69\x73\x20\x70\x67\x67\x67\x67\x67\x67\x20\x6d\x75\x73\x74\xe0\xe0\xe0\xe0\xe0\xe0\x6e";
int unsigned y = 0;
for(unsigned int x = 0; x < b_s; x++)
{
b[x] ^= decode_string[y];
if(++y == (sizeof(decode_string) - 1))
y = 0;
}
}
Pointer b points to memory with the content of defs.ref and b_s is just
size of the buffer.
2.2. Packed with ZIP with simple password
After "decrypting" there is a ZIP file with file 29388543757543549 inside.
The file name is visible in ad-aware.exe. The ZIP file is password
protected and the password is "This program ^u@_LSstreams145681902". First
part of the password [This program ^u@_LSstreams] is in plaintext inside
ad-aware.exe, second part is created runtime.
2.3. No checksum in the def file
After "decrypting" and decompressing there is a definition file with
following structure.
[header]
[family names]
[www names]
[family descriptions]
[obj_stream]
offset size description
32h WORD? internal build
80h ???? version of ref file, ends with 0ffh
100h ???? family names, separated by 0ffh, ends with 0ffffh
???? ???? www names, separated with 0ffh, ends with 0ffffh
and content of ini file
(comments for family names)
gets stored to description.ini
???? ???? stream of objects ... starts with word OBJ_STREAM(n)[x]
where n is prolly number of the stream streamu (1 for now)
- IMHO preparation for incremental updates -
and x is nunmber of objects in the stream
at the end of stream there is 0ffffh again
[Example of reference file, info gives ad-aware directly]
Definitions File Loaded:
Reference Number : SE1R47 24.05.2005 offet 80h
Internal build : 55 offst 32h
File location : G:nadanadadefs.ref ...
File size : 435074 Bytes file size before decompression
Total size : 1439523 Bytes file size after decompression
Signature data size : 1408291 Bytes sizeof(family descriptions) + sizeof(obj_stream)
Reference data size : 30720 Bytes family names size
Signatures total : 40174 [x] * 1.46 + www names
CSI Fingerprints total : 886 entries in OBJ_STREAM with type 0f0h
CSI data size : 30371 Bytes sizeof entries with type 0f0h
Target categories : 15 known before
Target families : 679 count of family names
There is no checksum of the content of the definition file nor is the file
signed. It is trivial to modify the content of the file, for example
modifying checksums of malware binaries by malware that wants to hide
itself from Ad-aware is thus really _very_ easy.
2.4. Big redundancy in the def file
The definitions consist of registry keys, www sites, file names and the
most visible part form the checksums of malware binaries.
[ Snippet from defs.ref]
...
3830397280 10842529196097280 97280
3657194622 106199918742094622 94622
3830994208 1059056701129094208 94208
3697194208 105862934264094208 94208
3697194210 1058568963132094210 94210
...
Every checksum entry consists of a header, reference to family name and
three ASCII numbers. Two of the numbers are checksums concatenated with file
size and the third one is the file size.
...
38303[97280]
108425291960[97280]
[97280]
...
2.5. Poorly written checksum algo
Computation of first level checksum
unsigned int compute_first_level_fingerprint(unsigned char *b)
{
unsigned int checksum = 0;
for(unsigned int x = 0; x < 0x600; x += 0x20)
{
checksum += b[x];
checksum += x;
}
return checksum;
}
Computation of second level checksum
unsigned int compute_second_level_fingerprint(unsigned char *b, int l)
{
unsigned int checksum = 0;
unsigned int x = 0;
for(; x < 0x2000; x += 0x2)
{
checksum += b[x];
checksum += x;
if(x >= (l - 2))
break;
}
for(x = (l >> 1); x < (l >> 1) + 0x7ffc; x += 0x2)
{
checksum += b[x];
checksum += x;
if(x >= (l - 2))
break;
}
return checksum;
}
Pointer b points to buffer holding content of the file, l is the
buffer/file size.
...
sprintf(size, "%d", x);
sprintf(first_level, "%d%d", compute_first_level_fingerprint(b), x);
sprintf(second_level, "%d%d%d%d", compute_second_level_fingerprint(b, x), (unsigned char) b[x >> 1], (unsigned char) b[x - 4], x);
...
first_level now holds the first level checksum
second_level now holds the second leve checksum
size now holds the file size
Now we can just do a string compare against checksum entries in data file.
If match is found, the fourth word is a index into family names string
list. There are also entries that have description incorporated, but the
entry structure is very easy to guess - feel free to explore it on your
own.
As you can see, the checksum is really very basic one and could be easily
spoofed. Colisions are easy to find. Next thing is the ASCII format of the
checksums and file size concatenating.
Lavasoft claims "Now Ad-Aware and Ad-Watch Use much smaller
reference files" and I just have to say: you really want me to believe
that?
2.6. !!! Multiplying the number of entries in the def file with constant
1.46 to make it look it has more definitions !!!
And the last and the worst thing about definition file. They take the x
number from OBJ_STREAM (ie. the real object/entries count in the
definition file) and MULTIPLY it with number 1.46 and this value is then
showed to the user as REAL number of definitions in the file. WTF?? They
must be kidding me!
2.7. Poorly written scanning algo (slow as hell)
"Scanning speed increased" is written in PR blablas that come with
Ad-Aware SE. I must laugh when I hear this. I must laugh _very_ loudly.
The psudo-C code of Ad-Aware file scan algo follows.
for entry from entries
{
alloc_mem(file_size);
read_file_to_memory(); // no memory mapped files, ReadFile()
count_checksums();
if(does_match_entry(entry, checksums))
break;
free_mem();
}
The real "Scanning speed increased" algo follows.
map_file_to_memory();
count_checksums();
for entry from entries
{
if(does_match_entry(entry, checksums))
break;
}
unmap_file_from_memory();
So if you run the Ad-Awares file scan and you hear disk making noisy
sounds, it's not like Ad-Aware is doing a good job finding the malware on
your drive. It's just it uses very poorly written algo, that makes a lot
of unnecessary disk reads thus wasting resources of your computer.
2.7. CSI works only for in-memory images and is useless
"Uses our all new CSI (Code Sequence Identification) technology to
identify new and unknown variants of known targets"
Oh. What a technology! I wondered how they're doing this, I was thinking
about some emulation engine, code shrinker, advanced pattern matching ...
I also thought (everyone must think that) that CSI is used on file
scanning basis. It's not. CSI scanning is used only when scanning memory
and thus ... is useless. Another PR blabla.
3. [Outro]
"Lavasoft's Ad-Aware SE, the world's leading brand in antispyware
solutions, has been acknowledged and awarded in variety of distunguished
magazines and publications all over the world."
--
Acknowledged!
btw it's not just a coincidence that the Ad-Aware engine uses another PR
crap firm F-Secure in their products for fighting with spyware. Nice
simbiotic.
This text was written in the city of Sofia
(C) 1999-06 Roy Batty, who is a stranger in the world he was made to live in
roy.batty@phreaker.net
Eddie lives...somewhere in time
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