Quote:
Because it was a rebuttal to your breathless adoration.
Maybe this is a language issue, because you could not have possibly been reading my post. The only place I say anything nice about it's security is that it is _likely_ the most secure system of a very insecure set of systems. (single level)
Then I went on to focus on a one of the system's theoretical issues. The only real plus I focused on was the lack of administration needed as you have effectively taken what would be a subsystem on a general purpose operating system and made it stand alone.
Quote:
But they don't mean jack if there's a bug in their TCP code. Anyone can ramble on and on about Java this and least privilege that, but they're just blowing smoke if the low-level implementation is flawed.
You clearly have no understanding of how this system works. You keep needing to place it in the context of a normal operating system. Even if the TCP implementation is flawed... what are you gonna do with it? You've got no access to syscalls that can violate system confidentiality or integrity, so what have you got? A fat goose egg.
Perhaps you should go back and read the documentation more carefully (or perhaps at all) and you will see that the only effective way to compromise data on the system would be via user supplied web applications, but even those cannot effect the system, only other objects within the same compartment. And even then it gets kinda iffy as to what exact access would be allocated to such a rouge process.
Quote:
That is a long way from a perfect system, though.
I never said it was a perfect system, I said it offered high security for a low security type system and that it was easy to administer. In fact, not only did I not say it was perfect:
Quote:
It is by no means a perfect solution
Learn to read before you try and show everyone how clever you are.
Quote:
Yeah, I think s/he meant that perfect subsystems do exist.
No, I meant perfect systems. They are merely the result of extensive formal methods and of course tremendous costs. Is this system in question perfect? Read above. It falls under #2 in that it is possible to design the system in a manner that it needn't be perfect to be immune security wise.
The benefits of high level trusted systems (to which this has taken a few aspects to extreme) is that you don't need to worry about patching because the model and security kernel are verified and user level software like the web server or like the IP stack CANNOT effect the overall system security. This concept has been around since the mid 70's, I am amazed you are not familiar.
They have done this in a rather standard way, that is to minimize the system so much that there is essentially nothing for an attacker to leverage. Nothing new, nothing creative... just the first time I'd seen it offered at the commercial level. Cobalt systems for example still have a general purpose OS on them.
catch