Eye Witness Identification
This is a Georgia Supreme Court ruling that basically says that eye-witness identification is not reliable enough to convict and individual of a crime. Now granted, eye-witness testimony is the least reliable of permissible evidence in a courtroom, but to throw it out entirely is just plain stupid. It doesn't matter now if you witnessed a murder, your testimony doesn't count.
Here's my concern though if eyewitness testimony is not admissable because it is inaccurate, imagine how this will affect law enforcement's ability to identify a criminal with whom a direct line of sight has been lost.
Quote:
By a 4-3 vote, the Supreme Court has reversed the Court of Appeals of Georgia in Brodes v. The State, S04G2101. Justice Robert Benham authored the majority opinion; Justices Carley, Thompson and Hines dissented.
The Court found that appellant “was convicted of two counts of armed robbery in a trial in which the only evidence implicating him was the testimony of the two victims identifying him as the perpetrator,” and that “[t]he victims testified they were ‘absolutely certain’ of their identification of him and were repeatedly called upon by the prosecuting attorney to repeat their certainty in the accuracy of their identification.” His convictions were upheld by the Court of Appeals.
In reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court has ruled that “[i]n light of the scientifically-documented lack of correlation between a witness’s certainty in his or her identification of someone as the perpetrator of a crime and the accuracy of that identification, and the critical importance of accurate jury instructions as ‘the lamp to guide the jury’s feet in journeying through the testimony in search of a legal verdict,’ we can no longer endorse an instruction authorizing jurors to consider the witness’s certainty in his/her identification as a factor to be used in deciding the reliability of that identification.” [footnote omitted]
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Carley argues that “[a]lthough today's decision deals only with the ‘level of certainty’ as a factor in eyewitness identification, it sets a very dangerous precedent. It allows expert opinion testimony to determine the permissible scope of the trial court's authority to instruct the jury on the legal principles applicable in a case.” Justices Thompson and Hines joined in the dissent.
Attorney for Petitioner: Henry A. Hibbert
Attorneys for Respondent: Paul L. Howard, Jr., D.A.; Alvera A. Wheeler, A.D.A.