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The "China problem" is the extreme example of an anonymity and anti-censorship system: a global active adversary with a lot of manpower and money, and severe penalties to discourage people from trying.
We're not working on this problem right now; we have our hands full as it is, and I'm also not convinced that we understand the problem correctly or have a good handle on the requirements.
In any case, Tor might be part of a solution. Here we enumerate four problems that must be overcome to beat the government firewall problem:
We need a set of exit nodes on the free side, who will connect to arbitrary places. Tor is achieving this.
We need a set of entry nodes on the free side. it needs to be tens of thousands, not just a few hundred. Tor is achieving this too: imagine one day down the road the Tor client GUI has a little "help China" button in the corner, which causes the clients to relay a few kilobytes per second for others.
We need a mechanism for telling dissidents about client IPs without letting The Adversary enumerate client ips. Hard problem; good luck.
We need a mechanism by which Tor traffic can be unobservable: that is, you need to be able to watch somebody and still not realize he's sending or receiving Tor traffic. Hard problem; good luck.