Originally Posted by
576869746568617
It should have been done alot sooner.
While they are very convient, they pose a tremendous risk to both the OPSEC and CIA of a network.
The previous incidents in both Iraq and Afghanistan should have outlined to DoD the tremendous risk that they posed to both OPSEC and CIA.
At the time of those incidents, their main concern was an OPSEC one - controlling the spillage of classified matterial and PHI that were leaked to outside sources. They were too nearsighted to see the other risks to CIA.
In the years since those incidents, there have been numerous exploits and proof of concept attacks demonstrated at both BlackHat and DEFCON concerning these devices.
The blame rests with the agency CIO's and DAA's who did not formulate effective countermeasures when conducting their risk analysis.
It also rests with the IA managers, department managers, and commanders at every level for not ensuring that the end-users had the proper training needed to mitigate the risk.
Unfortunately, there is no patch for human stupidity.