Yuna, do you mean that separate VLAN does not prevent from arp spoofing!?Quote:
Of course , but changing his MAC address is quite possible ?
Of course it does not, but you'll be only able to spoof mac adresses belonging to default_VLAN!
Remember that target is on VLAN A.
I believe (but i'll be very happy to be contradicted on this one) that the only naughty power of the attacker placed on default_vlan is a DoS attack on all VLAN but not compromising the confifentiality of other VLAN than default_vlan.
Indeed, switch MAC table is common to all VLANs (have a look in the RFC, VLAN are identified in the table thanks to additive parameter vlan_id or tag),
1- therefore the malicious attacker could flood with a large number of mac adresses (e.g incremental) and force the switch to drop valid mac adresse, temporally denying services to legal users!
2- the attacker could also duplicate MAC adresses to perturb the MAC table, but normally good switch implementation should prevent from taht risk by first looking at the vlan_id argument before mac adresses => such swich prevent from trouble with duplicate mac on separate VLAN.
(I'll test it on my lab if I have the opportunity to, but if someone had already done it i'll be glad to know about :D )
