Giving you a weak system securely configured and myself a stronger one horribly configured proves that the system is more important than the admin.

Giving us the same system would demonstrate nothing on the importance of the system type. Remember, my whole arguement is that the system type is more important than the admin. Having a secure system configured as badly as damn near possible be more secure than another system heavily locked down proves my point soundly.

If your argument was correct, it wouldn't matter what systems we used, yours would be configured better and would therefore be more secure by your logic on how it all comes down to the admin.

I use the exagurated systems to prove the point clearly, but it is just as true when comparing more similar systems.

Any "normal", production OS written for general "consumption" reaches a point where it can no longer be secured without it becoming unusable
This would be a myth except for your use of the very vauge terms "normal" and "general." I have a few highly secured NT/UN*X work alikes that are radically different in structure from what most people are used to, yet your average user cannot tell the difference and they drop in seemlessly into normal general consumption environments. The only way you can tell it is different is my using a normal exploit against it.

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